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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
JULIANNE EVANS,
Appellant

,
:
:

Case # 20000065-CA

:

Priority 2

i

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee

:
'

(

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

<

Julianne Evans appeals from a decision entered by the Honorable Thomas Willmore of
the First District Court of Utah, denying her Motion to Suppress. This court has jurisdiction over
i
the appeal of the court pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 78-2(a)-3(2)(e) Utah Code
Annotated (Supp. 1999).
<

ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal is whether the consent allegedly given by appellant
was voluntary, or coerced, when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances.

^

Standard of Review
A '"trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary is to be
<

4

reviewed for correctness.' State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993). However, 'the
trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly
erroneous.' State v. Harmon 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)." State v. Archuleta 925 P.2d
1275,1277 (Utah App. 1996).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section XIV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
On March 25,1999 , a Division of Child and Family Services caseworker went
unannounced to the home of Julianne Evans to remove her newborn child on allegations of
dependency, neglect or abuse of the child. Officer Crapse and Officer DeRyke of the Brigham
City Police Department were dispatched to Ms. Evans' home on a keep the peace call (Record at
94, page 2, lines 19-25)("R. at p.2,11.19-25"). Ms. Evans, though distraught and upset that her
infant was being taken away from her, was cooperative with the caseworker of the Division of
Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), and the officers. (R. at p.6,1.10). The officers noted that
Ms. Evans was "in a distressed state." (R. at p. 19,1.6). The officers did not observe Ms. Evans
to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (R. at p.6,11.14-15). While Ms. Evans was
packing up baby formula and toys for the infant, Officer DeRyke asked Ms. Evans if they could
"take a quick look around the house." (R. at p.7,11.2-4). Ms. Evans paused in her packing, and
stated "I don't know what to say to you." (R. at p.7,11.9-10) Officer DeRyke asked, "does that

5

mean you have something here that you don't want us to find?" (R. at p.7,11.12-13). Ms. Evans
remained silently packing her baby's belongings. (R. at p.7,11.15-16). Officer Crapse asked
again, "do you mind if we search the home." (R. at p.7,11.21-22).

,

Ms. Evans, packing up the

baby's belongings, shook her head no. (R. at p.7,1.24). Officer Crapse persisted, "is that no, you
don't mind if we do that, or no, you don't want us to look around." (R. at p.8,11.5-6). Ms.
Evans sat still and contemplated her response. (R. at p.8,11.10-11). Ms. Evans made no
indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17).

<

Again, Officer DeRyke asked if they could search the home. (R. at p.28,11.9-10). Again, the
Defendant remained silent, and did not indicate, verbally or otherwise, that the officers could
search the home. (R. at p.9,11.1-3). Officer DeRyke further stated, "if you have drugs here look
what its doing to your life, look what its doing to your family. It's ruining your life." (R. at p.29,
11.17-19). Officer Crapse continued, "I'll tell you what, if you give me the drugs you have in the

,

house I promise not to take you to jail today." (R. at p.9,11.13-15). Officer Crapse had no
intention of arresting Ms. Evans at that point. (R. at p.9,1.25 to R. at p. 10,1.1). Again, Ms.
Evans merely contemplated the officers' statement, and made no indication of consent to a
search. (R. at p. 10,1.13). Finally, Ms. Evans responded that she could not remember where she
had any drugs. (R. at p. 11,11.4-5). Officer Crapse asked her to think of where she normally kept
her drugs and look for them there. (R. at p. 11,11.9-10). The DCFS worker added, " it would be
best for you to give this officer what drugs you have so when you get sent to take a urinalysis it
will come back as negative." (R. at p. 10,11.19). Ms. Evans subsequently went to her purse, and
produced a small container with alleged controlled substance. (R. at p.l 1,11.14-17).
Subsequently, Officer Crapse prepared a permission to search form which he had Ms. Evans
6

.

sign. (R. at p. 17,11.9-11). The officers searched her home, finding further evidence of alleged
controlled substance. (R. at p. 14,11.20-21).
Appellant, by and through her attorney of record, motioned to Suppress Evidence at a
hearing held before the Court on August 10,1999. The Honorable Thomas L. Willmore entered
a memorandum judgment on Appellant's Motion to Suppress on October 13,1999. (R. at 6164). Ms. Evans entered a conditional plea of guilty, and preserved her right to an appeal.
Appellant was sentenced on a third degree felony on December 22,1999, and a judgment and
order of probation was entered on December 22,1999. (R. at 78-79).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Probable cause can be difficult to pin down, and getting a warrant takes time. Rather than
laboring under the state and federal prohibition against unreasonable searches, an officer can
easily persuade a member of the public to give "consent." Confused and upset by an encounter
with law enforcement, the average citizen easily agrees to a search of his or her person and
property.
However, a consent that is the product of duress and coercion is not consent. If the
Fourth Amendment protection is to be upheld, a consent search must be given freely and
intelligently, in an environment free of strong-arm tactics, even emotional pressuring. Finally, a
police officer may not claim consent was given because the suspect never adamantly, explicitly,
and consistently refused. Instead, the burden is on the State to overcome every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and to show that consent was
validly obtained.

7

In the instant case, Ms. Evans, a young mother, finds herself in a personal crisis. DCFS
shows up at her home to take away her newborn infant. DCFS is accompanied by two male

(

officers, fully uniformed, carrying firearms. As she hurriedly packs the baby's belongings, and
receives hasty instructions from DCFS, the two officers ask her repeatedly if they can search the
home. Obviously distraught, Ms. Evans tells them she does not know how to respond to them,
but they persist. In the course of obtaining "consent," the officers employ several techniques.
They question her directly several times. When she says no, they attempt to "clarify." Finally,
they try to work a deal: "produce contraband, and we will not take you to jail today" even though
they have no cause to take her to jail at that time. The DCFS worker also implies that she will
have a better opportunity to visit her infant if she produces contraband for the officers.
The "consent" obtained by the Brigham City police officers was anything but. Ms. Evans
only relented once she had been questioned several times, and threatened by incarceration. When
viewed in the totality of the circumstances it is clear that Ms. Evans' consent was the product of
coercion and duress, and was thus invalid. As such, evidence obtained against her is properly
i

suppressed.
ARGUMENT
I.

Search Violated Ms. Evans' Rights Under the United States and Utah Constitutions.

i

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." According to the well established judicial doctrine, the right
to befreefromunreasonable governmental intrusion exists "whenever an individual may harbor
i
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a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S. Ct. At 1873 (quoting
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)(Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Fourth Amendment further requires that a search be conducted pursuant to a
warrant based on probable cause. There are, however, several narrow exceptions to the warrant
requirement, including but not limited to: a search incident to arrest, a search of an automobile
based on probable cause because it contains contraband, and seizure of evidence in the plain
view of one who is lawfully in the placefromwhere the evidence is seen. State v. Hygh. 711
P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1987).
The Court determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts exist to establish
the constitutionality of a search by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case. Once the Defendant has raised the issue of an invalid search and seizure, the burden shifts
to the State to prove that the search and seizure was valid, and that the circumstances of the
seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752,
762, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah
1984); State v. Sterger. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991)("Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.")
This Court has established an analyticalframeworkfor determining whether the State has
met its burden of proving that a consent was voluntarily given: (1) There must be clear and
positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently
given'; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or
implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, the Court will] indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
9

convincing evidence that such rights were waived." State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 467 {quoting
State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
1990)( quoting United States v. Abbot. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977); see also United States
iLMedlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988).

a.

Evans' Consent Was Not Freely and Intelligently Given.

First, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evans' consent was freely and
intelligently given, as it was given under the most chaotic and personally disturbing of
circumstances. Secondly, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evan's consent was
unequivocal and specific. On the contrary, Ms. Evans' consent was the very definition of
equivocation.
Ms. Evans was clearly not in the state of mind to give consent to search freely and
intelligently, as the police officers found her in the middle of a personal crisis. At the
suppression hearing, Officer Crapse testified he was called to the home of Ms. Evans on March
25, 1999, as a Division of Child and Family Services caseworker went unannounced to the home
of Julianne Evans to remove her newborn child from her (R. at p2,11.19-25). Officer Crapse and
Officer DeRyke both noted in their testimony that Ms. Evans was obviously distraught and upset
that her infant was being taken away from her. (R. at p. 19,1.6). Ms. Evans was hurriedly packing
up baby formula and toys for the infant, and was receiving information from DCFS about visiting
her child, and how her child would be provided for (R. at p.7). It is in the middle of this chaotic
and disturbing time, that the officers repeatedly ask if they can search the home (R. at 94.7-11).
As Ms. Evans explicitly states, she does not know how to respond to the
\
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officers at that point in time (R. at p.7,11.9-10). She pauses in her packing, indicating her
uncertainty, and her inability to process the information being requested by the officers. (R. at
•p.7).
b.

Evans' Consent Was Not Unequivocal and Specific.

Further, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evan's consent was unequivocal
and specific. Instead, Ms. Evans' consent defines uncertainty and equivocation. At the
suppression hearing, Officer Crapse testified there were a series of exchanges that took place
between Ms. Evans and the officers. (R. at p.7,11.14). At first, Ms. Evans did not know what to
say (R. at p.7,11.9-10). Ms. Evans then shakes her head no (R. at p.7,1.24). When the officers
fail to obtain the response they want, they persist. Officer Crapse states that he is forced to
clarify whether they may search or not, specifically because her answer is so indefinite. (R. at p.8,
11.5-6). At no point did Ms. Evans make any indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers
could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17). The officers asked whether that was "no she did not
mind if they searched" or "no, they could not search." (R. at p.8,11.5-6). Also, Ms. Evans nodded
or shook her head from side to side in response to another request to search (R. at p.8). After
repeated requests to search the home, Officer Crapsefinallypromises Ms. Evans she would not
go to jail that day (R. at p.9,11.13-15). From the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, it
is clear that Ms. Evan's production of the alleged contraband and later consent to search were not
unequivocal and specific. Were it so, the officers would not have had to continually request
permission to search; the officers would not have been unsure about whether Ms. Evans was
stating "no, she didn't mind if they searched" of "no, she did mind if they searched." Finally, if
the consent was unequivocal and specific, the officers would not have had to make a promise to
11

Ms. Evans in exchange for permission to search. It requires the persistent requests of the
officers, and the contributing of the comments of the DCFS worker for Ms. Evans to finally give

i

in. Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the officers take advantage of Ms.
Evans when she is in a weakened state. Although Ms. Evans was involved in a traumatic
i

situation personally, having her newborn child removed from her, the officers show no
compassion for those circumstances. Even when she denies them permission to search her home,
they assert that such denial is equivocal, and for that reason, they were compelled to clarify.

<

Finally, had the consent to search been unequivocal and specific, the officers would not have had
to bargain for permission to search.

II.

The State Cannot Prove that Ms. Evans9 Consent Was Given Without Duress or
Coercion, Express or Implied.
<

"A consent that is the product of duress and coercion is not a consent at all." Harmon
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). Because Ms. Evan's alleged consent was produced by the deceptive
practices of the officers, all fruits of her invalid consent are properly suppressed. The issue of

i

whether a consent to search is voluntary depends upon 'the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances — both the characteristics of the [person consenting] and the details of police
conduct." State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.
412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), accord Harmon, 910 P.2d at
1206. Elements showing the absence of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of a claim of
authority to search by the officers, 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, 3) a
mere request to search, 4) cooperation by the defendant, and 5) the absence of deception or trick

12

(

on the part of the officer. State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 1980), as cited by State
v. Archuleta 925 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah App. 1996).
a.

Officer Crapse Coerces Consent by Making a Claim of Authority.

The officer's statement that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she produced
contraband represents a claim of authority by the officers. Firstly, the two officers show up in
full uniform, bearing firearms (R. at p. 15). DCFS and the officers are removing Ms. Evans'
infant child from her care, an overwhelming display of the authority of the State (R. at p.2).
Against this backdrop, Officer's Crapse represents that he has both the discretion and the
authority to decide whether or not she will go to jail that day (R. at p. 10). His statement
represents express coercion in that he indicated that Ms. Evans was somehow afoul of the law,
and the threat of jail was imminent if she did not comply. His statement also implies that he had
some reason to take Ms. Evans to jail at the time he made the statement.
b.

The Officers's Requests Exceed a "Mere Request" to Search

In the instant case, the officers clearly exceed a mere request to search. The officers
begin by asking if they can search. When the officers fail to obtain the response they want, they
persist. At no point did Ms. Evans make any indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers
could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17). The officers attempt to "clarify" her negative
response (R. at 94.8.5-6). Again, Ms. Evans nodded or shook her head from side to side in
response to another request to search (R. at p.8). After repeated requests to search the home,
Officer Crapse finally promises Ms. Evans she would not go to jail that day (R. at p.9,11.13-15).
It requires the persistent requests of the officers, and the contributing of the comments of the
DCFS worker for Ms. Evans to finally give in.
13

c.

Officer Crapse Deceives Ms. Evans into Believing He Has the Authority and
Cause to Arrest Her.

The officer's statement that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she produced
contraband also represents deception on the part of the officers inasmuch as the Officer readily
admitted that, at the time he made the statement, he had no cause to take Ms. Evans to jail (R. at
p.25,1.22). In fact, Officer Crapse had no authority to take Ms. Evans to jail until after the
alleged controlled substance was produced. Ms. Evans gave consent simply because the Officer
promised he would not take her to jail. However, at the time of the promise, Officer Crapse had
no authority to make such a promise because there was no basis upon which to take Ms. Evans to
jail at that time. Officer Crapse was there merely on a keep the peace call, and not on any

<

independent business of the police department (R. at p.2). Because of this, Officer Crapse clearly
deceived Ms. Evans into thinking that he had the authority to take her to jail.
CONCLUSION
Taking advantage of one's emotional state cannot be tolerated when one's constitutional
rights are involved. No person could be expected to make calm, rational decisions when one's

(

newborn infant is removed, regardless of the circumstances leading to removal. The officers
conceded that Ms. Evans seemed very upset and emotionally distraught throughout their
exchange. The officers capitalized on Ms. Evans' fragile condition by further playing on her
emotions. It is when Officer DeRyke makes a blatant appeal to her emotional state, saying, "y° u
have drugs here and look what its doing, you're losing your family and it's ruining your life."
that Ms. Evans finally begins to weaken, producing evidence against herself.

Further, solid

relations between police officers and the public require that officers not deceive the public into
<

14

believing the officers possess an authority that they do not. Officer Crapse had no authority or
ability to arrest Ms. Evans or take her to jail at that time. Thus, the promise by Officer Crapse
that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she turned over the drugs falsely asserted that he
possessed an authority which he did not. As such, his representation was coercive and amounted
to deception or trick on the part of the officer. Viewed in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the State cannot prove that Ms. Evans consent wasfreelyand intelligently given,
absent coercion or duress. For this reason, all evidence presented against Ms. Evans is properly
suppressed. Accordingly, her appeal should be granted, and the First District Court's judgment
overturned.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) 2* day of June, 2000.

JUSTIN BOND
Attorney for Appellant

L^
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Addendum 1
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Pagel

910 P.2d 1196, State v. Harmon, w a h 1995)
*1196 910 P.2d 1196
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Julie HARMON, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 930414.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 14, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1996.
Defendant was convicted in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., of
possession of controlled substance, and she appealed
from denial of motion to suppress evidence. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, 854 P.2d 1037.
Certiorari was granted. 868 P.2d 95. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) arrest was valid, and
(2) consent to search was voluntary.

Questions whether arrest was constitutional and
whether consent to search was voluntary are
questions of law reviewed for correctness.
3. AUTOMOBILES <S=>349(4)
48A
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(4)
License or registration offenses.
Utah 1995.
Police had statutory and constitutional authority to
effect full, custodial arrest of driver caught driving
after her license was suspended, regardless of
whether officer's subjective intent was to obtain
consent to search driver's home for drugs.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14;
U.C.A. 1953, 77-7-2.

Affirmed.
Durham, J., dissented and filed opinion in which
Stewart, Associate C. J., joined.
1. CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 1134(3)
110 —
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General
1 lOkl 134(3) Questions considered in general.
[See headnote text below]
1. CRIMINAL LAW <®^ 1158(1)
110 —
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings
110kll58 In General
HOkl 158(1) In general.
Utah 1995.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews decision
of Court of Appeals, not decision of trial court; in
so doing, court adopts same standard of review used
by Court of Appeals and reviews questions of law
for correctness and trial court's factual findings for
clear error.
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@=> 1134(3)
110 —
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General
1 lOkl 134(3) Questions considered in general.
Utah 1995.

4. AUTOMOBILES <@=*349(10)
48A —48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10)
What is arrest;
stop
distinguished.
Utah 1995.
Term "arrest," as used in Motor Vehicle Act
refers to detention or traffic stop rather than to
formal, custodial arrest. U.C.A. 1953, 41-1-17
(1991).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
5. AUTOMOBILES <§==>349(4)
48A —
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(4)
License or registration offenses.
Utah 1995.
Statute limiting police authority to arrest for
misdemeanor traffic violations did not apply to arrest
for driving with suspended license, inasmuch as
statute by its terms applied only to Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways, and driving after
suspension was violation of a different statute.
U.C.A. 1953, 41-6-166, 53-3-227; U.C.A. 1953,
41-2-136 (1992).

Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

910 P.2d 1196, State v. Harmon, (wcah 1995)

Page 2

6.AUTOMOBILES <§=>349(3)
48A —
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(3)
Offense in officer's presence, in
general.
Utah 1995.
General statute governing arrest allows police
officers, at their discretion, either to cite or to arrest
for traffic offenses committed in their presence.
U.C.A. 1953, 77-7-2.
7. ARREST <®=>68(4)
35 —
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k68
Mode of Making Arrest
35k68(4) What: constitutes seizure.
Utah 1995.
Arrest of person is quintessentially a "seizure,"
required by Fourth Amendment to be reasonable.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
8. AUTOMOBILES <®==>349(4)
48A —
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(4)
License or registration offenses.
Utah 1995.
Custodial arrest for driving with suspended
driver's license is "reasonable," within meaning of
Fourth Amendment, in light of public safety
concerns and fact that allowing unqualified driver to
proceed on her way without valid license permits the
unlawful activity to continue.
U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 4;
U.C.A. 1953, 53-3-227;
U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-136 (1992).
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
9. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <S=*23
349 —3491 In General
349k23
Fourth Amendment
reasonableness in general.
Utah 1995.

and

In defining scope of Fourth Amendment right,
there is no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing need to search or seize
against invasion which search or seizure entails.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
10. ARREST <@=*58
35 —
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k58
Grounds and purpose in general.
Utah 1995.
Two primary governmental interests are served by
taking suspect into custody: insuring that suspect
will answer charges against him or her and
preventing harm to the public.
11. ARREST <®=>63.4(2)
35 —
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63
Officers and Assistants, Arrest
Without Warrant
35k63.4
Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63.4(2)
What constitutes such cause in
general.
Utah 1995.
Validity of arrest depends upon police officers'
objective authority to arrest, as opposed to subjective
motivations for arrest, and, therefore, otherwise
valid arrest is not rendered unconstitutional by fact
that officer may have had other motives for the
arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
12. ARREST <®=>63.1
35 —
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63
Officers and Assistants, Arrest
Without Warrant
35k63.1
In general.
Utah 1995.
Rejection of pretext doctrine with regard to Fourth
Amendment challenges to arrests extends to state
constitutional challenges to arrests.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14.
13. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <&=> 181
349 -—
349V Waiver and Consent .
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl81
Particular concrete applications.
Utah 1995.
Defendant's consent to sesj.:h her home was
voluntary, despite allegations that officer made false
claims of authority to search and made show of force
in order to obtain consent, where defendant
continued to withhold consent to search in response
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to those alleged actions, did not consent to search
until some time later after being read her Miranda
rights, and was friendly and cooperative during
search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1,
§ 14.
14. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=>180
349 -—
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl80
Voluntary nature in general.
Utah 1995.
Whether consent to search is voluntary depends on
totality of surrounding circumstances, including
characteristics of accused and details of police
conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art.
1, § 14.
15. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@^182
349 —
349V Waiver *1196 and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl82
Prior official misconduct;
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit.
Utah 1995.
Consent to search that is product of duress and
coercion is not "consent" at all.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
16. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>182
349 —
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl82
Prior official misconduct;
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit.
Utah 1995.
Factors indicating lack of duress or coercion in
obtaining consent to search include absence of claim
of authority to search by officers, absence of
exhibition of force by officers, mere request to
search, cooperation by owner of property to be
searched, and absence of deception or trick on the
part of the officer. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
17. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@^182
349 -—
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl82
Prior official misconduct;
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit.
Utah 1995.
Statement by police that they have valid search
Copyright (c) West Group 1999

warrant in hand, when, in fact, they do not, is
"coercive" for purposes of determining whether
consent to search was voluntary.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
18. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>182
349 —
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl82
Prior official misconduct;
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit.
Utah 1995.
It was deceptive, for purposes of determining
whether defendant's consent to search was
voluntary, for police officer to tell defendant that he
"could" come back with a warrant when he, in fact,
knew that he could not obtain a warrant. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
19. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <§=>184
349 —
349V Waiver and Consent
349kl79 Validity of Consent
349kl84
Custody, restraint, or detention
issues.
Utah 1995.
Consent to search given while one is in custody is
not, per se, involuntary; question is whether
officers used coercive tactics or took unlawful
advantage of the arrest in order to obtain consent to
search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*1197 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen. and J. Kevin
Murphy, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Joan C. Watt, Mark R. Moffat, and Robert K.
Heineman, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
HOWE, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision in this case. Siate v. Harmon, 854
P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.), cert, granted, 868 P.2d 95
(Utah 1993). Defendant Julie Harmon entered a
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, while reserving her
*1198 right to appeal the trial court's denial of her
pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The court of
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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appeals affirmed her conviction. Id. at 1041.

would have to get a warrant, and that they would
"tear my house apart." Russo did not recall making
these statements. Harmon admitted to Russo that
she had been afraid to let him into her home because
at one time she had sold drugs and the home
contained drug paraphernalia but that she was trying
to clean up her act. She told him that if he drove her
back to her home, she would sign a search consent
form and let him in so that he could retrieve those
items. Russo did not promise her any benefit for
permitting a search of her home and told her that she
would probably go to jail anyway. When Harmon
again told Russo she would consent to the search of
her home, Russo turned his car around, started back
to her home, and called for assistance. On their
arrival, Russo again advised her of her Miranda
rights and read her a written consent form which she
signed. Harmon's dog was in the home. Harmon
indicated that the dog may try to bite the officers.
Russo told her that he would have to shoot her dog if
it attacked the officers. After some discussion, the
officers permitted Harmon to go into the *1199
home alone to take the dog out into the back yard.

I. FACTS
On November 19, 1991, Detective Robert Russo,
an eight-year deputy county sheriff assigned to the
Metro Narcotics Task Force, received a tip from an
informant that Harmon was distributing narcotics
from her home in Magna. At approximately 6:00
that evening, Russo went to her home to ask her for
information confirming or rebutting the accusations.
When he arrived, Harmon was in her car backing
out of her driveway.
Russo approached her,
identified himself, told her about the tip, and asked
if he could search her home. She denied the
accusations and refused to allow the search, stating
that she was on her way to visit her father, who had
recently suffered a heart attack and was returning
home from the hospital.
Russo advised Harmon that if she refused to
consent, he "could come back at a later time with a
[search] warrant," which, he warned, was an
"unpleasant experience." (FN1) She again declined
to allow an immediate search. Russo testified that
Harmon said she would allow him to search upon
her return. However, Harmon testified that she told
him that if he wanted to "hang around," she would
talk to him when she returned.
Harmon then drove to her parents' home. As she
drove away, Russo called to check on Harmon's
driver's license and was informed that it had been
suspended. He decided he would arrest her for
driving with a suspended driver's license ("driving
on suspension"). Seeing Harmon drive by shortly
thereafter, Russo called for an assisting officer in a
marked patrol car, and together they stopped her in a
parking lot two blocks from her home. Russo placed
her under arrest for driving on suspension, and she
was handcuffed by an assisting officer.
The
testimony differs at this point, (FN2) but both parties
agree that Harmon informed Russo that he would
need a warrant if he wanted to search her home.
Russo searched her person incident to the arrest
and found pills in a prescription vial with its label
scratched off. (FN3) He also confiscated $285
found in Harmon's purse. Russo placed her in his
car, advised her of her Miranda rights, and
proceeded to take her to the Salt Lake County jail.
The other officers stayed behind to impound her car.
Harmon testified that on the way to jail, Russo told
her that he knew she had drugs in her home, that he

Russo and several back-up officers proceeded
inside. Harmon, who was friendly and cooperative
during the search, assisted the officers by pulling
various items of drug paraphernalia and illegal drugs
out from underneath a sofa in the living room. She
was permitted to telephone her brother-who is a
police officer-to seek advice. When the search
concluded, Russo permitted Harmon to stay at her
home with instructions to phone him the following
morning.
She was not cifd'd for driving on
suspension but was later charged with possession of
a controlled substance.
Harmon moved to suppress the evidence obtained
during the search of her home. The trial court
denied the motion, and she subsequently entered a
conditional guilty plea and was placed on probation
for eighteen months. The court of appeals affirmed
the denial of her motion to suppress, holding that
Harmon's stop and arrest were not unconstitutional
and that her consent to search her home was freely
and voluntarily given. Harmon, 854 P.2d at
1039-40.
II. ANALYSIS
[1] [2] We first clarify our standard of review. On
certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n. 2 (Utah
1992); see also Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 850
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P.2d 1267, 1269 n. 4 (Utah 1993). In doing so, this
court adopts the same standard of review used by the
court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are
reversed only if clearly erroneous. Landes v.
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)
; see also State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah
1990). The issues presented in this case-whether
Harmon's arrest was constitutional and whether her
consent to search was voluntary—are questions of
law that we review for correctness. See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993).
The trial court's underlying factual findings will not
be set aside unless they are found to be clearly
erroneous. Id.
A. Validity of Harmon's Arrest
[3] Harmon contends that the court of appeals
erred in holding that her arrest for driving on
suspension did not violate the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution or article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution.
1. Statutory Authority to Arrest
Initially, we observe the fundamental rule that
courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if
the case can be decided on other grounds. West v.
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah
1994); Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. Thus, we
begin by examining whether the arrest was valid
under our state statutes. If it was not, then we need
not go further.
[4] When Harmon was arrested in November
1991, Utah's Motor Vehicle Act provided:
[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly
authorized by the [motor vehicle] department or by
law shall have the power and it shall be their duty:

(b) To make arrests upon view and without
warrant for any violation committed in their
presence of any of the provisions of this act or
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or
the use of the highways.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) (emphasis
added). (FN4) The State argues that the "shall"
wording of this statute made it presumptively, if not
conclusively, Russo's duty to take Harmon into
custody for driving on suspension.
This

interpretation of the statute is not persuasive.
Obviously, it is not police policy and practice to
arrest all traffic offenders- *1200 -in fact, almost
the exact opposite is true. The statute, originally
passed in 1935, used the word "arrest" to mean a
seizure or detention, not a formal, custodial arrest.
"An arrest is an actual restraint of the person
arrested or submission to custody." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-7-1 (emphasis added). Under this definition, a
traffic stop qualifies as an arrest because the alleged
violator is not free to leave until he is satisfactorily
identified and has signed a written promise to
appear, even though the stop is a limited seizure
more like an investigative detention than a custodial
arrest. See State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 594
(Utah Ct.App.1992); see atoUtah Code Ann. §
41-6-167(d) (referring to "the arresting officer's"
issuance of traffic citation to "the arrested person").
Thus, the proper interpretation of section 41-1-17 is
that officers have the authority and duty to "arrest"-meaning stop or seize-traffic offenders. The section
does not authorize or require officers to take all
traffic offenders into custody. (FN5)
[5] Harmon asserts that police authority to arrest
for a misdemeanor traffic violation, including
driving on suspension, is limited by the following
sections:
41-6-166.
Appearance
misdemeanor-Setting Bond

upon

arrest

for

Whenever any person is arrested for any
violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor,
the arrested person, for the purpose of setting
bond, shall in the following cases, be taken
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate
within the county in which the offense charged is
alleged to have been committed and who has
jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most
accessible with reference to the place where said
arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an
immediate appearance before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge
of driving or being in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or combination thereof....
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge
of failure to stop in the event of an accident
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to
property.

Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

910 P.2d 1196, State v. Harmon, (Utah 1995)
(4) In any other event when the person arrested
refuses to give his written promise to appear in
court as hereinafter provided, or when in the
discretion of the arresting officer, a written
promise to appear is insufficient.
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-ContentsPromise to comply-Signing-Release from
custody....
(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a
misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not] (FN6)
immediately taken before a magistrate as
hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall
prepare in triplicate or more copies a written
notice to appear in court containing the name and
address of such person, the number, if any, of his
operator's license, the registration number of his
vehicle, the offense charged, and the time and
place when and where such person shall appear in
court.

(d) The arrested person, in order to secure
release as provided in this section, must give his
written promise satisfactory to the arresting officer
so to appear in court by signing at least one copy
of the written notice prepared by the arresting
officer. The officer shall deliver a copy of such
notice to the person promising to appear.
Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith release the
person arrested from custody.
(Emphasis added.)
Harmon contends that under section 41-6-166,
persons stopped for misdemeanor traffic *1201
violations are to be arrested and arraigned in only
four specific circumstances: (1) when requested by
the suspect, (2) when arrested for DUI, (3) when
arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the suspect
refuses to sign the promise to appear contained in the
citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the
written promise to appear is insufficient. She argues
that for all other misdemeanor traffic violations,
officers have the authority to issue a citation only for
a violation under section 41-6-167, after which they
must release the suspect.
We decline to address this argument because these
sections do not apply to the violation for which
Harmon was arrested. By their very terms, both
sections apply only when a person is arrested for
"any violation of this act." "This act" refers to the
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Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways,
passed by the legislature in 1941. See 1941 Utah
Laws 113-40. The act in its present form is now
codified at title 41, chapter 6. Thus, the reference
to "this act" should now properly be read "this
chapter," meaning chapter 6. The driving on
suspension statute upon which Harmon's arrest was
based was not part of the original Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways and is not part of
title 41, chapter 6 of the current code. Rather, the
statute was initially passed in 1933, see 1933 Utah
Laws 82, and has been renumbered several times,
most recendy at section 41-2-136 (Supp.1987) and
section 53-3-227 (Supp.1993). If Harmon had been
subject to a formal, custodial arrest for a violation
under title 41, chapter 6, the interpretation of
sections 41-6-166 and -167 would be squarely before
us. Because these sections apply only to arrests for
violations of title 41, chapter 6 of the Code, and we
are not faced with an arrest under that chapter, these
sections are not relevant to the issue before us.
[6] Utah's general statute governing arrests
provides, "A peace officer ... may, without warrant,
arrest a person ... for any public offense committed
or attempted in the presence of any peace officer...."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (emphasis added).
However, "[a] peace officer, in lieu of taking a
person into custody ... may issue and deliver a
citation requiring any person subject to arrest or
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge
to appear at ... court...." Utah Code Ann. §
77-7-18 (emphasis added). Both of these statutes are
couched in permissive language allowing police
officers, at their discretion, to either cite or arrest
for traffic offenses committed, in their presence.
(FN7) In this case, Harmon drove on suspension in
Detective Russo's presence and in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-2-136(2) (Supp.1990) (now codified
at § 53-3-227(2)). We conclude that Russo was
statutorily authorized to arrest Harmon for driving
on suspension.
2. Reasonableness of the Arrest Under the Fourth
Amendment
[7] Even though the arrest was permissible under
statutory authority, Harmon contends her arrest still
violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal
constitution, which prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures."
The arrest of a person is "
'quintessential^ a seizure,' " required by the Fourth
Amendment to be reasonable. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 63
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v.
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Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428, 96 S.Ct. 820, 830, 46
L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
[8] Although the United States Supreme Court has
not examined whether a custodial arrest for a traffic
offense could be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the issue did arise in a concurring
opinion in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94
S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). In that case,
Gustafson was pulled over for weaving across the
center line. He could not produce a driver's license,
and the officer placed him under arrest. The officer,
in searching Gustafson, discovered marijuana.
Gustafson conceded that the arrest was lawful,
basing his appeal
*1202
only upon the
constitutionality of the subsequent search. Id. at
262, 94 S.Ct. at 490. Justice Stewart began his
concurrence by stating:
It seems to me that a persuasive claim might be
made in this case that the custodial arrest of the
petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But no such claim has been made.
Instead, petitioner has fully conceded the
constitutional validity of his custodial arrest.
Id. at 266-67, 94 S.Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 450 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2858 n. 11, 69
L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court has not imposed constitutional
restrictions on authority to arrest for routine traffic
stops), rev'd on other grounds, United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72
L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 220-21, 94 S.Ct. 467, 470, 38 L.Ed.2d
427 (1973) (defendant similarly conceded the legality
of arrest for driving on suspension and for obtaining
a permit by misrepresentation). The issue, at least
regarding an arrest for driving on suspension, is now
before us.
[9] "In defining the scope of Fourth Amendment
rights, 'there is "no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search [or seizure] entails." ' " State v. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (alterations in original)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S.Ct.
1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)); see also 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at
435-36 (1987) [hereinafter 2 LaFave]. In other

words, "the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d
660 (1979). We apply this balancing test to assess
an officer's choice to arrest-rather than merely to
detain and cite-a person for driving on suspension.
The test permits consideration of a totality of
circumstances, recognizing that a multitude of
factors may influence an officer's discretion to
arrest.
[10] Two primary governmental interests are
served by taking a suspect into custody: insuring
that the suspect will answer the charges against him
or her and preventing harm to the public. See Utah
R.Crim.P. 6(b) (magistrate may issue summons in
lieu of arrest warrant if it appears accused will
appear and "there is no substantial danger of a
breach of the peace, or injury to persons or
property, or danger to the community"); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-7-2(3)(a), (c) (authorizing arrest where
officer has reasonable cause to believe person
committed offense and person may "flee or conceal
himself to avoid arrest" or "injure another person or
damage property belonging to another person"); 2
LaFave at 435 ("Arrest is justified when a person
may flee from legal process, or where he may
constitute a danger to the public if allowed to remain
at large."). (FN8) Arrest of a suspect can enhance
the state's interest in assuring appearance by
allowing officers to establish the suspect's identity,
investigate the suspect's ties to the community, and
require a bond or other condition of release. Arrest
of a suspect can also support the state's interest in
protecting public safety by removing from the public
those who present a danger to others.
Nothing in the record indicates that Detective
Russo's arrest of Harmon was motivated by the
governmental interest of assuring her appearance at
trial to answer the charge of driving on suspension.
There was no question as to her identity. Her home
was just a few blocks away, and her brother, a
deputy sheriff, and her father, recovering from a
heart attack, both lived in the area. The State admits
that "given her community ties, *1203 Harmon was
relatively unlikely to evade prosecution for driving
under suspension."
Indeed, the officers* actions
best demonstrate that they did not consider her a
flight risk: after they discovered drugs in her
home~a much more serious offense than driving on
suspension-they permitted her to stay at her home,
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with instructions to phone Russo the following
morning.
Those who drive while on suspension, however,
do present genuine public safety concerns. License
suspension can result from any number of serious
driving problems:
convictions for automobile
homicide, DUI, or reckless driving; mental or
physical limitations; or driving or permitting the
driving of an uninsured vehicle. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 41-2-127, -128 (Supp.1992) (now codified
at §§ 53-3-220, -221). The State correctly asserts,
"A driver whose license has been suspended should
be presumed unfit to drive, owing to the problems
that prompted the suspension." When that person
continues to drive in deliberate violation of a legally
binding order not to drive, the governmental interest
in keeping the public safe is compromised.
Physically removing the offender from the road
helps achieve this interest by preventing the
offender, at least for a time, from resuming the
dangerous activity and by emphasizing to the
offender the seriousness of the offense, thereby
discouraging future violations.
These governmental interests must be weighed
against the intrusion that the arrest entails.
A custodial arrest is a serious intrusion on a
person's freedom and privacy. In a society in
which freedom and independence are valued,
arrest is the gravest of indignities. One arrested is
not only no longer free to walk away, but also is
suddenly in the control of another human being. If
he resists, force will be used. A person arrested
can no longer choose when he eats, with whom he
associates, where or whether he will sit or stand,
or even when he may go [to] the bathroom.
Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the
Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution
to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic
Offenses, 62 Temple L.Rev. 221, 263-64 (1989). In
addition, any full custodial arrest, even for a
misdemeanor traffic violation, allows an officer to
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested
person, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 477,
and his or her vehicle, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768
(1981).
We recognize that a number of factors weigh in
favor of Harmon's argument that her arrest was
unreasonable. First, she was arrested only blocks
from her home to which she could have walked,
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arguably without any danger of future harm to the
public. Second, driving on suspension is a class C
misdemeanor, comparable to most other traffic
offenses.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-12(1)
(violations of traffic rules and regulations are class C
misdemeanors unless otherwise provided). Finally,
the officers apparently have few, if any, limits on
their discretion to arrest since there are no statutory
{see section II.A. 1. above) or administrative (we
find none in the record) guidelines governing that
decision. But see State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592,
595-96 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (holding that officer
abused his statutory discretion in arresting, at
gunpoint, person who exceeded the speed limit by
about twenty miles per hour). (FN9)
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that
Harmon's arrest for driving on suspension was not
unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in
removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public
safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly
held that driving on suspension is sufficiently serious
to justify the offender's arrest rather than mere
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580
So.2d 216, 217 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied,
592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169
Ill.App.3d 289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123, 129, 523 N.E.2d
1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125
Ill.Dec. 223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988), *1204 cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 104
L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184,
642 A.2d 947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part
because driving on suspension "poses grave danger
to the public"); State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 633
A.2d 1362, 1364 (1993); State v. Reding, 119
Wash.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992)
(overruling prior contrary authority). (FN 10)
Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a
single case where an arrest for driving on suspension
has been held to be unconstitutional.

I

<

\

^

(
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This holding should be construed narrowly and
does not necessarily apply to other traffic violations.
"It should be the policy of every law enforcement
agency to issue citations in lieu of arrest or
continued custody to the maximum extent consistent
with the effective enforcement of the law."
2
LaFave at 432 (citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to
Pretrial Release § 2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968)); see
also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult to
imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine
traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be
justified."). As we stated in Lopez:
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may
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request a driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.
However, once the driver has produced a valid
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use
the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his
way, without being subjected to further delay by
police for additional questioning."
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah
Ct.App.1990)); see also United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988). In this case,
Harmon could not produce a valid driver's license or
evidence of entitlement to use her vehicle. Her
offense of driving on suspension is different from,
for example, speeding, because allowing her to
"proceed on her way" without a valid license permits
the continuation of her unlawful activity. We
conclude that her arrest was reasonable.
3. Pretext Arrest Doctrine
[11] Harmon argues that we should apply the
"pretext doctrine" to her traffic arrest. The pretext
doctrine focuses on whether a hypothetical
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the
circumstances, would have undertaken the
challenged Fourth Amendment activity. Lopez, 873
P.2d at 1134. In Lopez, we rejected the doctrine as
applied to temporary stops for traffic violations. We
concluded that settled "cause-to-stop" and "scope-ofdetention" rules adequately protect citizens from
improper police stops for traffic violations. Id, at
1135-36.
We also explained that the doctrine
erroneously
focuses
on
the
subjective,
"unconstitutional motivation" of the detaining officer
and discourages equal protection of the law. Id. at
1136-40. We are now presented with the issue of
whether a pretext analysis may still be applied to
invalidate an arrest when it appears the arresting
officer hoped to discover evidence of criminal
activity other than that for which the arrest was
made.
In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext
arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert,
denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 476, 126 L.Ed.2d
427 (1993). There, a man arrested for violating his
parole was also, at the time of his arrest, a murder
suspect. Id. at 1237.
In seeking to have his
incriminating statements about the murder
suppressed, he asserted that he was arrested for the
sole purpose of gathering evidence against him on
the murder charge rather than for the parole
violation. We stated, "An arrest may not be used

rage y

solely as a pretext to search for evidence of another
crime." Id. at 1237-38 (citing United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76
L.Ed. 877 (1932)). Although we suggested that an
arrest could be unconstitutionally "pretextual," we
upheld the arrest for the parole violation. We held:
*1205 [I]f police have a valid right to arrest an
individual for one crime, it does not matter if their
subjective intent is in reality to collect information
concerning another crime.... In other words, if
the alleged pretext arrest could have taken place
absent police suspicion of the defendant's
involvement in another crime, then the arrest is
lawful.... The arrest was not rendered invalid
solely because the officers had a separate motive
for arresting him....
Id. at 1238 (citing, among others, 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) (1987)
[hereinafter 1 LaFave]).
Unfortunately, the pretext issue was not squarely
before the court in Archuleta because the officers
had attempted to arrest the parolee for the parole
violation even before they suspected him of
involvement in the murder. Id. In other words,
they "would" have arrested him even if he had not
been a murder suspect. Nevertheless, the opinion
indicates that where officers were justified in
arresting a defendant for crime A-even if the
defendant would not have been arrested but for his
or her suspected involvement in crime B~the arrest
for crime A would still be valid.
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), we
considered another pretext arrest argument. In that
case, officers pulled over a car whose occupants
were suspected in a recent theft. Id. at 934. The
passenger in the car was arrested for giving false
personal information to an officer. At the jail,
officers conducted a search of the defendant and
discovered cocaine. Id. The defendant contended
that his arrest for giving false information was a
pretext for the search. Id. at 941. We stated:
"This contention is based on the assumption that the
arrest was improper. Because we find that the
officers had probable cause to arrest Pena [for giving
false information], we do not consider his pretext
argument." Id. (citing Archuleta, 850 P.2d at
1237-38). As in Archuleta, we held that where
officers were authorized to arrest a defendant for
one crime, it did not matter that their subjective
intent may have been to collect information
concerning another crime. In fact, the court in Pena
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refused to examine any consideration other than
whether the arrest for the stated crime was proper.
This is the position taken by the United States
Supreme Court. In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, reh'g denied,
438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150
(1978), federal agents wiretapped a telephone which
they believed was being used by drug dealers. The
agents made no attempt to comply with a portion of
the wiretap statute requiring that such activities be
conducted so as to minimize their interceptions of
nondrug-related conversations. The Court found
that the agents' actions were reasonable under the
circumstances and rejected a proposed examination
of the agents' motives:
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's
action does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.
Id. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38
L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)); see also United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n. 3, 103
S.Ct. 2573, 2577 n. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983)
(refusing to examine customs officers' motives when
they were authorized to board ship); 1 LaFave §
1.4(a), at 83 (supporting the above wording in Scott
as "precisely what the rule ought to be").
Other courts have similarly held that the officers'
objective authority to arrest, not their subjective
motive, is the relevant inquiry. In People v.
Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, 330 N.W.2d 405, 406
(1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 917, 103 S.Ct. 1900,
77 L.Ed.2d 288 (1983), a case with facts somewhat
similar to those in this case, police officers arrested
a suspected drug dealer for driving on suspension.
The defendant asserted that his arrest was really a
pretext to search his car. Id. at 407. The Michigan
Supreme Court held:
The fact that the police officers effectuated the
arrest also realizing that they might find narcotics
or other evidence of illegal activity is entirely
irrelevant, unless police officers primarily
concerned with enforcing *1206 certain laws are
prohibited from enforcing other laws as well. We
are aware of no such constitutional proscription.
Id.; see also State v. Pickett, 126 Ariz. 173, 613
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P.2d 837, 838 (Ct.App.1980) (officer properly
arrested person suspected of other crimes for
drinking alcohol in public); Tray lor v. State, 458
A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 1983) (officer properly
arrested suspected drug dealer for driving on
suspension); People v. Anderson, 169 Ill.App.3d
289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123, 129, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040
(1988) (officer properly arrested murder suspect for
driving on suspension).
In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine,
Harmon argues that her arrest was unconstitutional
because even if she "could" have been arrested for
driving on suspension, a reasonable officer in
Detective Russo's position "would" not have done
so. After considering our opinions in Lopez,
Archuleta, and Pena, as well as cases from other
jurisdictions, we conclude that the "pretext arrest"
analysis should be rejected for many of the same
reasons that we rejected the "pretext stop" analysis.
The validity of an arrest must be analyzed on
objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective
motivations or suspicions. Inquiring into "what a
reasonable officer would do" focuses on a question
that is falsely objective, "fails to provide the
consistency and predictability officers need," and
ignores the possibility that usual police practice may
be unconstitutional. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1138.
Rather than debating the label or propriety of
Detective Russo's motivations, we need only look at
whether his arrest of Harmon for driving on
suspension was reasonable under the balancing test
in the previous section. If it was reasonable, it was
constitutional.
4. Reasonableness of the Arrest Under Article I,
Section 14
[12] Harmon argues that even if the arrest was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
federal constitution, the arrest was unreasonable
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
We disagree.
The federally based balancing
analysis, although admittedly imprecise, is
straightforward,
unburdened of unworkable
"pretext" inquiries, and fundamentally sound. In
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1140, we concluded that
"because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse
to adopt it under article I, section 14 ... of the Utah
Constitution." This holding also applies to pretext
arrests.
B. Consent to Search
[13] Harmon contends that the court of appeals
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erred in holding that her consent to search her home
given to Detective Russo following her arrest was
voluntary and not the fruit of an illegal arrest.
Because we have concluded that Harmon's arrest for
driving on suspension was valid, we need only
examine whether her consent was voluntary. See
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262.
[14] [15] [16] Whether a consent is voluntary
depends upon " 'the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances-both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of police conduct." Id. at
1262-63 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689); see also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218, 226, 93
S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A "consent"
that is the product of duress and coercion is not a
consent at all. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 401
(1991). Factors indicating a lack of duress or
coercion include
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search;
4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5)
the absence of deception or trick on the part of the
officer.
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah
1980); see also State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 8
(Utah Ct.App. 1994).
In this case, the first and fifth factors are closely
related so we will examine them together. Harmon
asserts that Detective Russo made a false claim of
authority to search, involving deception and trickery,
by implying that he could get a warrant if she
withheld her consent. At their initial confrontation,
Russo advised Harmon that if she refused to consent
to a search of her home, he "could come back at a
later time with a [search] warrant," the execution of
which he warned *1207 was an "unpleasant
experience."
Later, on the way to jail, Russo
allegedly told her "he would have to" get a warrant.
At the suppression hearing, Russo admitted that he
knew he did not have sufficient evidence to obtain a
warrant. (FN11) Yet Harmon testified, "He acted
like he could run two blocks away and get it. That
was my impression."
[17] Clearly a statement by police that they have a
valid search warrant in hand, when in fact they do
not, is coercive. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 549-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d
797 (1968). Less clear, however, is the validity of a

police threat to obtain a warrant if consent is
withheld. According to the leading scholar of search
and seizure issues, "[t]he only noticeable difference
between a false claim that a warrant has been
obtained and a false claim that a warrant mil be
obtained is that the latter is less immediate...." 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(c), at
187 (1987) [hereinafter 3 LaFave]; see also United
States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495-98 (2d
Cir.1974) (Newman, J., concurring). The claim is
especially offensive when there is a clear lack of
information to obtain a warrant. See State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268, 1274 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)
("[A]ny indication by officers that issuance of a
warrant was inevitable would vitiate an ensuing
consent if probable cause was anything less than
iron-clad.").
[18] Russo's statement that "I could" come back
with a warrant, while not as misleading as "I will"
come back with a warrant, is still troubling. It
implies full confidence that a warrant will issue.
Even worse, the statement may cause a layperson to
believe that the warrant will automatically issue,
without any exercise of judicial power. Even though
the trial court found that he "made no
representations that he would most likely be granted
a warrant," we conclude that Russo's representation
that he "could come back" with a warrant, when in
fact he knew he could not come back with a warrant
absent more evidence, was deceptive. See Dotson v.
Somen, 175 Conn. 614, 402 A.2d 790, 794 (1978)
(police represented that they "could" get a warrant);
State v. Mitchell 360 So.2d 189, 191 (La. 1978)
(police represented that they could get a warrant "in
twenty minutes"). (FN12)
While Russo's statement is one factor indicating
coercion, it does not, by itself, render Harmon's
later consent involuntary. Importantly, Harmon
refused her consent to the search following Russo's
statement. She simply drove away. Russo's second
alleged statement-that "he would have to" get a
warrant as a result of Harmon's refusal to .allow the
search-was accurate and not coercive. It is also
significant that the trial court credited Russo's
testimony that he "informed Harmon multiple times
that he was not authorized to search her house
without her consent" because he did not have a
search warrant. The record confirms that Harmon
always knew that Russo did not have a warrant and
could not search absent her consent.
[19] Harmon asserts that there was a clear
exhibition of force when four officers participated in
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arresting and searching her, confiscating her money,
and searching and impounding her car. A consent
given while one is in custody does not, per se,
render the consent iavoluntary, but it is an important
consideration. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)
; Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. " 'The question is
whether the officers used coercive tactics or took
unlawful advantage of the arrest situation to obtain
the consent.' " 3 LaFave § 8.2(b), at 182 (quoting
United *1208 States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730
(5th Cir. 1973)).
In assessing this question, we examine die
characteristics of this arrest. Id. at 183. The arrest
did not occur late at night, was not made at
gunpoint, was not made by a forcible entry, and did
not involve the use of force against Harmon.
However, Harmon argues that Russo used the arrest
as leverage to obtain consent to search, i.e., he
would not take her to jail if she gave her consent. If
true, this fact certainly would be a significant
aggravating factor demonstrating lack of voluntary
consent. See id. at 183 n. 48. However, the trial
court specifically found that "Detective Russo did
not promise Harmon any benefit for permitting a
search of her house and stated that Harmon would
probably go to jail" even if she consented to the
search.
Harmon does not mount an argument
against that credibility assessment. We conclude
that it is supported by the record and is not clearly
erroneous.
Although Harmon was placed in handcuffs upon
her arrest, this apparently did not have any real
impact upon her decision to consent since, at that
time, she clearly refused to allow the search. Only
later, after any "show of force" had dissipated, did
Harmon agree to the search. Other cases involving
far more extreme demonstrations or threats of force
have resulted in holdings that consents or
confessions were voluntarily given. See Thurman,
846 P.2d at 1272-73; State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
464 (Utah 1988); State v. Hegelman, 111 P.2d
1348, 1350 (Utah 1986).
Harmon alleges that Russo made repeated
"demands" to search her home. The record does not
support this assertion. At their first confrontation,
Harmon refused Russo's request to search and drove
away. Harmon testified that after her arrest some
time later, Russo again asked to search-an assertion
that he denied. (FN13)
Even assuming that
Harmon's testimony is true, both parties agree that
she again refused to allow a search at that time.
Copyright (c) West Group 1999
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Only later in Russo's car, and not in response to any
request, did Harmon state that she would allow a
search.
Harmon further asserts that her concern for her
father's health made her more susceptible to consent
because she did not want to cause him additional
stress.
Although her father was apparently
recovering from a heart attack, he was no longer in
the hospital and apparently somewhat active. When
Harmon went to visit her father after refusing
Russo's initial request to search, she discovered that
he had gone elk hunting with a friend. Regardless of
his condition, the trial court correctly reasoned that
"it is not unusual for someone to be apprehensive
that family members will be upset to learn of that
person's arrest and pending criminal charges." We
are not persuaded that Harmon's apprehension about
her father prevented her from voluntarily consenting
to the search.
Other facts demonstrate that her consent was
voluntary. The record indicates that Harmon, once
past the indignation of her arrest, was friendly and
cooperative. She twice offered her consent after
being advised of her Miranda rights. Upon arriving
at her home, Russo repeated the Miranda warnings
and read to Harmon a written search consent form,
which she then signed. "[I]t is the duty of an
appellate court ... 'to examine the entire record and
make an independent determination of the ultimate
issue of voluntariness.' " Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464 n.
76 (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976)
). Having examined the record here, we conclude
that Harmon's consent to search her home was
voluntary.
We affirm the court of appeals' decision upholding
Harmon's conviction.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and RUSSON, J., concur in
Justice HOWE's opinion.
DURHAM, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that
"Harmon's arrest for driving on suspension was not
unreasonable in light of the governmental interest of
removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public
safety reasons," while simultaneously concluding
that "[n]othing in the record indicates that *1209.
Russo's arrest of Harmon was motivated by the
governmental interest of assuring her appearance at
trial."
Part of the rationale for the second
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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conclusion-that Harmon was eventually left at her
home and not incarcerated—is, it seems to me,
equally applicable to the first. In other words, there
is nothing in the record to suggest that Harmon's
arrest was motivated by the governmental interest in
getting her off the road for public safety reasons.
She was only a few blocks from her home; her car
was parked off the roadway, and she was not driving
it or threatening to drive it when arrested. This
arrest appears to have been motivated solely by the
desire of the arresting officer to intimidate Harmon
into consenting to a search of her home and, more
significantly, to have been unreasonable under these
circumstances.
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in Justice
DURHAM'S dissenting opinion.
FN1. At the suppression hearing, Russo admitted
that he did not have sufficient information to obtain
a warrant.
FN2. Harmon testified that Russo again asked her to
search her home and when she refused, he said,
"Then, you are going to jail."
According to
Harmon, she then asked, "[I]f I let you search my
house, then you [w]on't take me to jail?"
whereupon Russo responded, "You're right."
Russo denied asking to search following the arrest
or making any of these statements. The trial court
did not make any findings of fact regarding this
testimony.
FN3. The criminal charge based on the mislabelled
prescription medication was dismissed following
Harmon's preliminary hearing and is not
challenged in this appeal.
FN4. This statute has since been completely
rewritten and is now found at Utah Code Ann. §
41-la-107 and § 41-3-105. These current statutes
do not mention officers' arrest power for all
vehicle-related violations as did section 41-1-17.
But see § 41-3-105(8)(a) (1993) (officers "shall"
arrest for violations of the Motor Vehicle Act, title
41, chapter la, or the Motor Vehicle Business
Regulation Act, title 41, chapter 3).
FN5. Our use of the word "arrest" throughout the
remainder of this opinion refers to a full, custodial
arrest.
FN6. The word "not" was included in the original
1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949

Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that
"the only logical reading of the statute is that it has
application only when a citation is issued in lieu of
an arrest and no appearance is made before a
magistrate." Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d 1058,
1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the
statute should read "whenever a person is not
immediately taken before a magistrate."
FN7. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant
of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for
Traffic Offenses, 62 Temple L.Rev. 221, 250 n.
188 (1989) [hereinafter Salken] (listing Utah
among twenty-eight states that have no limitations
on police discretion to arrest for a traffic offense).
Many states have statutes that limit arrests for
traffic offenses. Id. at 251 n. 189.
FN8. Other governmental interests in arresting
suspects may include obtaining evidence of the
crime for which the suspect is accused, providing
certain social service functions, and maintaining
the proper respect for law and the police. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(3)(b); Salken, 62
Temple L.Rev. at 266.
FN9. See also Joanne R. Whiting, When Probable
Cause is
Constitutionally Suspect,
1991
Wis.L.Rev. 345, 369-72; Arthur Mendelson,
Arrest for Minor Traffic Offenses, 19 Crim.L.Bull.
501, 510-12 (1983) (both encouraging statutory
and administrative guidance to limit officer
discretion to arrest for traffic violations).
FN10. We note that in several Utah cases, arrests
for driving on suspension were not challenged.
See In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars,
823 P.2d 468, 469 (Utah 1992); State v. Rice, 717
P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Pacheco, 712
P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986); State v.
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah Ct.App.1990),
cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (1991); State v. Baird,
763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
FN11. At the suppression hearing, Harmon's
counsel asked Russo, "[B]ased on the information
you had, you couldn't have gotten a search
warrant, could you?"
Counsel for the State
objected to the question because the answer "calls
for the officer to make a legal conclusion." The
court initially sustained the objection but later
permitted the question after Harmon's counsel
clarified that Russo had applied for about forty
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search warrants before this incident and was
basing his testimony only upon his own
experience. Russo admitted that he did not have
enough information to obtain a warrant to search
Harmon's home.

stated, "[0]fficers would be well advised to refrain
from any commentary, direct or by implication, on
the likelihood a warrant would actually issue."
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274 n. 7 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).

*1209_ FN12. The court of appeals has wisely

FN 13. The trial court did not make any factual
finding regarding this testimony.
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"122 808 P.2d 122
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael Allen STERGER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900078-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 6, 1991.
Defendant brought motions to suppress evidence
consisting
of
controlled
substances,
drug
paraphernalia and sample of defendant's blood which
was obtained following automobile accident. The
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don V. Tibbs,
J., denied the motions. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that:
(1)
inventory search of defendant's automobile was
authorized and legal, but (2) remand was required to
allow for taking of findings of fact concerning issue of
voluntary consent.
Affirmed in part, remanded in part.
1. CRIMINAL LAW @^> 1130(5)
110 —
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(I) Briefs
110kll30
In General
11 Okl 130(5) Points and authorities.
[See headnote text below]
1. CRIMINAL LAW <©^=> 1178
110 —
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(R) Error Waived in Appellate Court
110kll78
In general.
Utah App. 1991.
Court would not consider whether inventory search
of defendant's vehicle violated Utah Constitution,
where defendant failed to brief or argue state
constitutional guarantees in either pretrial hearing or
on appeal.
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1158(4)
110 —
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings
110kll58
In General
1 lOkl 158(4) Reception of evidence.
Utah App. 1991.
Findings of fact supporting trial court's decision on
motion to suppress are reviewed under clearly

Pagel
erroneous standard. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
3. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=^66
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k66
Inventory and impoundment; time and
place of search.
Utah App. 1991.
Failure to offer defendant opportunity to make
arrangements for his car does not eliminate
justification for conducting inventory of car, or render
inventory illegal. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
4. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@^>60.1
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k60.1
In general.
Formerly 349k60
Utah App. 1991.
Deputy sheriff was justified in taking defendant's car
into custody following accident, where front
windshield of car was shattered, car was inoperable
and blocking road in remote area, all of car's
occupants had been taken for medical attention and
there was no opportunity to ask defendant what he
wanted done with car. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
5. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @^>58
349 —
3491 In General
349k58 Inventory or booking search.
[See headnote text below]
5. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®^66
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k66
Inventory and impoundment; time and
place of search.
Utah App. 1991.
Inventory searches meet the need to protect
individual property in police custody, protect police
against claims of loss or theft of property, and detect
dangerous conditions of instrumentality within
impounded vehicles. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
6. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ®^>66
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
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349k66

Inventory and impoundment; time and
place of search.
Utah App. 1991.
Police officer was authorized to examine and
inventory contents of defendant's vehicle, where
officer was authorized to take custody of defendant's
vehicle after it was involved in accident and all of
vehicle's occupants were taken for medical attention.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
7. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=^66
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k66
Inventory and impoundment; time and
place of search.
Utah App. 1991.
Bifurcated inventory search of defendant's vehicle
was legally justified, even though there was time lapse
of at least one day between impounding of defendant's
vehicle and time inventory was completed, where
initial search was performed contemporaneously with
impounding, and inventory was completed at later
time because remoteness of area required deputy
sheriff to prioritize his duties, which meant removing
victims for medical care, getting defendant's blood
drawn, and arresting and transporting defendant.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
8. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <3==>66
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k66
Inventory and impoundment; time and
place of search.
Utah App. 1991.
Where there is initial search performed
contemporaneously with impounding of vehicle, and
second search conducted after vehicle has been
impounded, both parts of search are legally justified.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
9. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ® ^ 6 5
349 —
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k65
Scope; trunk, compartments,
containers, and luggage.
Utah App. 1991.
Deputy sheriff did not improperly selectively open
containers in inventory search of defendant's vehicle;
deputy testified he opened all closed containers in
vehicle except sealed cans of food.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

10.SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <S=»194
349 —
349VI Judicial Review or Determination
349kl92 Presumptions and Burden of Proof
349kl94
Consent, and validity thereof.
Utah App. 1991.
Determination of whether defendant voluntarily
consented to blood test could not rest simply on trial
court's observation that defendant submitted to the
test; State must meet its burden of proof on consent
issue.
11 .AUTOMOBILES <@^418
48A
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak417 Grounds for Test
48Ak418
Consent, express or implied.
Utah App. 1991.
Implied consent statute was not applicable where
defendant was not placed under arrest prior to his
blood being drawn.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10,
41-6-44.10(l)(a).
*123
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for
defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and Dan R.
Larsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellee.
OPINION
Before BENCH, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ.
JACKSON, Judge:
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
denial of two motions to suppress evidence consisting
of controlled substances, drug paraphernalia and a
sample of defendant's blood which was obtained
following an automobile accident.
Defendant seeks review of the following issues: (1)
whether the inventory search of his automobile was
authorized and legal under the existing circumstances;
(2) and whether the sample of his blood was legally
taken. We affirm as to the evidence obtained during
the inventory search and remand as to the blood
sample.
FACTS
On July 23, 1989, the vehicle in which defendant,
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his wife and two passengers were riding, left the road
and collided with an embankment. The accident took
place in a remote area of eastern Garfield County,
Utah. Defendant left the vehicle and went for help.
A helicopter transported defendant's wife and the two
passengers to a hospital in Page, Arizona. Prior to
leaving the accident site, one of the passengers
accused defendant of being drunk and causing the
accident. The other passenger died en route to the
hospital. Defendant, who appeared to be the least
injured was transported to the Bullfrog Clinic, a
nearby medical facility.
Deputy Shawn Draper of Garfield County arrived
shortly after the accident. After the passengers had
been transported for medical attention, a tow truck
arrived to remove the inoperative vehicle from the
road. Because the vehicle was locked, Draper used a
"slim jim" to force open one of the doors. Draper
then inventoried the contents of the vehicle. During
the inventory, Draper opened a camera case and
found a film canister, which he also opened. He then
seized a green leafy substance found inside the
canister, believing it to be marijuana.
After
discontinuing the inventory, Draper had the vehicle
towed to his home in Ticaboo, Utah, where he
planned to continue the inventory. After the tow truck
left the scene, Draper drove to the Bullfrog Clinic,
where defendant had been transported, and called the
Sheriff's office to determine how to proceed. Draper
was instructed to have blood drawn from defendant.
Draper told defendant he was required to submit to a
blood test since he had been involved in an accident.
Defendant was not told he could refuse, and he was
not under arrest at this time. William Patrick Quinn,
a certified park medic, summoned Peter Hollis, a
physicians assistant employed by the Bullfrog Clinic,
to take the *124 blood. Hollis explained to
defendant that Draper wanted the blood taken, and
proceeded to take the blood.
After several
unsuccessful attempts by Hollis, Quinn located a vein
and started the catheterization. After defendant's
blood was taken, Draper transported him to
Koosharem, Utah, and placed him in the custody of
another deputy. The test revealed that defendant's
blood alcohol level was within the legal limit, but
traces of THC, a marijuana by-product were present.
The day following the accident, defendant's vehicle
was towed from Draper's ho
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except canned goods. In a Tupperware container,
Draper found marijuana and drug paraphernalia. He
seized these items. All of the items found in the
vehicle were eventually listed on an inventory sheet
by Draper.
At his pretrial hearing, defendant moved to suppress
the contents of the film canister, the contents of the
Tupperware container, and the results of the blood
test. Defendant alleged that these items were illegally
seized. The trial court denied his motions and this
appeal followed.
[1] At the outset, this court must determine if
defendant waived his state constitutional claims. The
State asserts that the lower court had no such
arguments before it and therefore the issue was
decided only under the United States Constitution.
We agree. This court has often urged counsel, most
recently in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73
(Utah Ct.App.1990), to include more than a "nominal
allusion" to state constitutional rights in appellate
briefs and arguments. In the present case, defendant
failed to brief or argue state constitutional guarantees
at either the pretrial hearing or on appeal.
Accordingly, we decline to consider his arguments
based on the Utah Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2] Findings of fact supporting a trial court's
decision on a motion to suppress are reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah R.Civ.P.
52(a). State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) (citing State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249
(Utah Ct.App. 1990).
INVENTORY SEARCH

impound yard. Draper completed his inventory of the
items in the vehicle two days after the accident.
Draper testified that he opened all closed containers,
Copyright (c) West Group 2000

[3] [4] Deputy Draper testified that he took custody
of defendant's car, inventoried its contents, and had
the car removed from the scene of the accident.
Defendant first argues Draper did not have to
impound the car but could have left it locked and
where it was. This assertion is without merit.
Defendant's car was partially blocking the road in a
remote area where the accident occurred. The front
windshield was shattered and the car inoperable. All
of the occupants had been taken for medical attention
and Draper had no opportunity to ask defendant what
he wanted done with the car. (FN1) "[T]he existence
or absence of justification for the impoundment of an
automobile may be determined from the surrounding
circumstances." State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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(Utah 1987) (citations omitted). Given the condition
of defendant's car and where it was located after the
accident, there was justification for taking the car into
police custody.
[5] [6] Before defendant's car was towed from the
accident scene, Draper inventoried its contents.
Inventory
searches
conducted
under
these
circumstances are justified, Cody v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706
(1973), and it is v/ell settled that such a search is an
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); State v.
Earl 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah *125 1986); State v.
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Inventory procedures meet three distinct needs: (1) to
protect individual property in police custody; (2)
protect police against claims of loss or theft of
property; and (3) detect dangerous conditions of
instrumentality within impounded vehicles. Johnson,
745 P.2d at 454 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369,
96 S.Ct. at 3097). Having determined that Draper
was authorized to take custody of defendant's vehicle,
a concomitant right existed to examine and inventory
its contents. See State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,
444 P.2d 517 (1968).
Our analysis does not stop at determining that the
impoundment and inventory search of defendant's car
were justified. We must also determine if the search
was conducted for inventory purposes, in a legal
manner, and not merely as a "fishing expedition for
evidence."
Defendant alleges that, even if an
inventory search was authorized, it was illegal
because it was not carried out pursuant to
standardized procedures. (FN2)
Bifurcated Inventory Searches
[7] The Garfield County Sheriff's Department has
written procedures governing when the contents of a
vehicle shall be inventoried, and how that inventory
shall be carried out:
4.05 Vehicle Inventories
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried.
A written inventory shall be made of all contents of
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked
containers. The trunk and also any compartments
shall be opened and the contents inventoried. AH
evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in
the evidence locker. Such record shall become a

part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle
changes from one person to another, the person
taking custody of the vehicle shall also assume
custody of the contents by placing his/her signature
on the inventory list.
These procedures are silent as to how soon after a
vehicle is impounded the inventory must be
completed, and whether bifurcated searches are
permitted.
The fourth amendment requires a sufficient
proximity in time between the impoundment of a
vehicle and the subsequent inventory search. Ex
Parte Boyd, 542 So.2d 1276, 1279, cert, denied, 493
U.S. 883, 110 S.Ct. 219, 107 L.Ed.2d 172 (1989).
Each moment, hour or day that passes detracts from a
full effectuation of the objectives of the inventory,
namely to protect property. Id. (FN3)
In the present case, there was a time lapse of at least
one day between the impounding of defendant's
vehicle and the time the inventory was completed.
However, the inventory was initiated immediately
after the accident. It was completed at a later time
because, as Draper testified, the remoteness of the
area required him to prioritize his duties, and that
meant removing victims for medical care, getting
defendant's blood drawn, arresting and transporting
defendant,
and
completing
the
preliminary
investigation of the accident.
[8] We agree with defendant that a bifurcated
inventory search, such as was conducted here, is not
specifically provided for in the applicable procedures.
That fact alone, however, does not make the inventory
search illegal. Where there is an initial *126 search
performed contemporaneously with the impounding of
a vehicle, and a second search conducted after the
vehicle has been impounded, both parts of the search
are legally justified. Cf. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S.
380, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 (1984)
(upholding a second search conducted after vehicle
was impounded); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.
259, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982) (upheld
warrantless search even though prior inventory search
had already been made); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803,
805 (Utah 1986) (warrantless search after automobile
impounded upheld).
Closed Containers
[9] Defendant also alleges that, contrary to the
inventory search guidelines, Draper did not open all
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closed containers found in the vehicle. The Garfield
County Sheriff's guidelines specifically state that "A
written inventory shall be made of all contents of
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked
containers." As to the opening and inventorying of
closed containers, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that standardized criteria, Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, 93
L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), or established routine, Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605,
2610-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), regulate the opening
of containers found during an inventory search. See
also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632,
1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (absent specific policies,
search not sufficiently regulated to satisfy fourth
amendment); Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28 (state
trooper's opening of a zipped bag during a warrantless
inventory search was defective in absence of
standardized police procedures mandating the opening
of closed containers during such a search).
We are not persuaded by defendant's argument. In
Shamblin this court interpreted recent cases to
establish "that the Fourth Amendment is violated
when closed containers are opened during a vehicle
inventory search in the absence of a standardized,
specific procedure mandating their opening."
Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28. (Emphasis added).
"With a standardized, mandatory procedure, the
minister's picnic basket and grandma's knitting bag
are opened and inventoried right along with the
biker's tool box and the gypsy's satchel." Id. at 428.
Draper testified that he opened all closed containers
except sealed cans of food found in defendant's
vehicle. He did not arbitrarily or selectively open
containers, as defendant would have us believe.
Accordingly, defendant's reliance on Shamblin is
misplaced. (FN4)
In this case, not only did
standardized procedures exist, but they were followed
as well.
Conclusion as to Inventory Search
None of the arguments put forth by defendant as to
the inventory search, persuade us that the evidence
obtained during that search should have been
suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
found in his vehicle.
BLOOD SAMPLE
[10] Defendant next claims that the sample of his
blood should be suppressed because it was drawn

without his consent, and because the persons who
drew the blood were not authorized to do so. We
deferentially review the trial court's determination that
defendant consented to the blood test, as is
appropriate with all factual determinations. State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). (FN5)
*127 Defendant contends that at no time did he
voluntarily consent to the blood test. He claims he
acquiesced because Draper told him he was required
to submit to a blood test. The State acknowledges
defendant was told that blood was required to be
drawn because there had been an accident, and they
do not dispute the inaccuracy of the statement.
Nonetheless, they contend, and the trial court found,
that defendant consented to the test twice: once after
he was told by Draper that a sample was required,
and again when the medical personnel present asked
him to proceed with the sampling.
The trial court found defendant consented simply
because there was no dispute in the record that
defendant submitted to the test.
However, a
determination of voluntary consent cannot rest on such
a cursory observation. In sustaining its burden that
voluntary consent was given the State must meet its
burden of proof:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and
"freely and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied; and
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1990)
(quoting United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885
(10th Cir.1977)) (citations omitted).
Our examination of the record reveals that the trial
court failed to make adequate findings of fact
concerning the issue of voluntary consent. The trial
court did not make any findings as to the factors
outlined above. The record is devoid, for example, of
any discussion regarding whether defendant knew that
he could refuse the test.
Second, Draper told
defendant such a test was required. Because factual
issues are best addressed at the trial level, State v.
Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct.App. 1991),
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we remand for a rehearing on this critical issue.
[11] In an alternative argument, defendant contends
that the blood test result should have been suppressed
because the blood sample was taken by persons not
authorized to draw blood pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44.10 (Supp.1990), the implied consent statute.
The State responded to this argument in their brief,
stating it was unnecessary to determine if Hollis and
Quinn were authorized to draw blood, because
defendant voluntarily consented to the blood test,
making the implied consent statute inapplicable. We
agree that § 41-6-44.10 is inapplicable to the facts at
hand, but we find it inapplicable for the reason that
defendant was not placed under arrest prior to his
blood being drawn. (FN6) Because the implied
consent statute *128. is not applicable in this case,
defendant's claim fails. (FN7)
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State, 649 P.2d 791 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982) (eighthour lapse due to officer in charge of inventory
being detained by complexity of accident in which
subject vehicle was involved); Black v. State, 418
So.2d 819 (Miss. 1982) (officers had to spend time
on emergency detail).
FN4. At any rate, a strict interpretation of the
Shamblin language was tempered by the United
States Supreme Court in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S.
1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990): "A
police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to
determine whether a particular container should or
should not be opened in light of the nature of the
search and the characteristics of the container itself.
The allowance of the exercise of judgment based on
concerns related to the purposes of an inventory
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id.
110 S.Ct. at 1635.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of
the inventory search of defendant's vehicle. As to the
motion to suppress the results of the blood test, we
remand for an examination of the voluntariness of
defendant's consent.
BENCH and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
FN1. In any case, failure to offer defendant an
opportunity to make arrangements for his car does
not eliminate the justification for conducting an
inventory of that property, Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), or
render the inventory illegal.
State v. Hygh, 111
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
FN2. Defendant states the following specific grounds
of error: (1) the inventory procedures did not
provide for bifurcated searches, (2) the procedure
for opening closed containers was not followed, (3)
the inventory sheet was not signed by the tow truck
driver when he assumed custody of the vehicle, and
(4) the procedures do not outline when the police are
to impound a vehicle. Because defendant fails to
cite support or provide any meaningful analysis as to
arguments three and four, we decline to rule on
them. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984).
FN3. Searches with a time lapse between
impoundment and the inventory have been upheld
under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Rudd v.

FN5. We note that there is no bright-line test used
when a reviewing court examines whether consent
to a search was properly obtained. Rather, "the
question of whether a consent to a search was in
fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
887 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041,
2047-48, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). See also State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) ("trial
court's finding of consent was clearly erroneous.");
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah
1980); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah
Ct.App. 1990); Webb, 790 P.2d at 82.
Federal
cases addressing voluntariness of consent to a
search have also traditionally spoken in terms of
voluntary consent as a fact question. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 23, 105 S.Ct.
409, 412, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (issue of consent a
factual issue); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1878-79, 64
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (voluntariness of consent is a
question of fact); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d
1141, 1153 (10th Cir.1986) (defendant's consent a
factual finding); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d
832, 839 (8th Cir.1986) (consent reviewed under a
"clearly erroneous" standard); United States v.
Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986)
(voluntariness of consent a finding of fact); United
States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 747 (1st Cir.1985)
(question of consent is one of fact, not of law);
United States v. Lopez, 111 F.2d 543 (10th
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Cir.1985) (trial court's finding of fact on issue of
voluntariness for consent cases must be accepted on
appeal unless clearly erroneous); United States v.
Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1984)
(standard of review for denial of motion to suppress
is the clearly erroneous standard).
*128_ FN6. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a)
(Supp.1990) provides that a person operating a
motor vehicle is considered to have consented to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine.
This statute is applicable only to persons who have
been placed under arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968) (implied consent statute
only applicable to persons who have been placed
under arrest); In the Interest of R.L.I., 111 P.2d
1068 (Utah 1989) (blood sample taken from motorist
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who was not under arrest, who was not informed he
could refuse to submit to the test, and who did not
consent thereto, was taken contrary to provisions of
implied consent statute and results therefore
inadmissible); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988) (chemical test cannot be taken without
driver's consent prior to arrest unless driver is
unconscious or otherwise not able to give consent).
FN7. Our counterpart in Oregon has addressed this
issue on similar facts, and held that defects in
administering such a test go to the weight to be
given its results by the trier of fact, but do not make
the results inadmissible. Gildroy v. Motor Vehicles
Division, 100 Or.App. 538, 786 P.2d 757, 758
(1990) (emphasis added).
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James Crapse - D
A.

That's what we were informed of, yes.

time Officer Deryke asked -- let's see.

I believe at that
(Pause.)

Yes. He

asked Ms. Evans if myself and he could take a look around
the house.
Q.

The report says a quick look around the house.

Is that

your best recollection?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then what was her response to that?

A.

Umm, she was gathering her stuff and said I don't know

what to say to you.
Q.

All right.

And then Officer Deryke's response to that?

A.

He quoted, does that mean that you have something here

that you don't want us to find, end quote.
Q.

Did Ms. Evans make any response at all?

A.

No, she didn't.

She just remained silent, still packing

the stuff.
Q.

And then you took over at that point, I think, at least

in terms of talking to her, is that correct?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And what did you ask her?

A.

I then asked her again if she would mind if we searched

the residence.
Q.

And did she reply or make some sort of response?

A.

She shook her head no and then I asked her --

Q.

She just shook her head, right?

James Crapse - D
Yeah.
Q.

She didn't say anything?

A.

(Witness shook his head.)

Q.

Okay.

A.

I then asked her is that no, you don't mind if we look

Go ahead.

around or, no, we can't look around.
Q.

So you were trying to clarify the issue at that point?

A.

This is correct.

Q.

And what did she do then, if anything?

A.

She still sat and contemplated as to what she should

respond with.
Q.

So she didn't say anything?

A.

No.

Q.

Didn't shake her head this time either?

A.

No.

Q.

No response?

A.

(Witness shook his head.)

Q.

Okay.

And then you asked her again, I believe?

A.

Yeah.

At that time, from past experiences, I felt that

there was something in the residence that she didn't want v|£
to know about or to find.
Q.

Okay.

A.

So at that time I told her that if she were to give

me - Q.

Excuse me, James.

Was there one other time you asked

J an tes C i apse

D

h e r a g a i n if y o u could look t h r o u g h t h e r e s i d e n c e a n d o n e
m o r e 1 1 m e s h e j u s t d i d.i i' L i e t» [. > L J I I i J":'"
A.

Correct.

Q

Okay.

A.

I said, quote, I'] 1 tell you what, if you give me the

A n d then y o u f inal ] y ti : Id 1 lei wl: lat ?

drugs you have in the house I promise not tc take you t :
jail today.
Q

And let me ask you a 1 i ttle bi t about that

^i*---.*

Wl lat

w e r e y o u t h i n k i n g about the p r o m i s e not t o take h e r to jail
today?
A

Okay-

I e x p l a i n e d to her that b e c a u s e of h e r s i t u a t i o n ,

her child b e i n g t a k e n away, that she w a s in such a
dist r^ssed srarp , chat if she g a v e m e t h e d r u g s right at
that, time that 1 would not a c t u a l l y h a n d c u f f h e r and take
her ili W M I ii I ii
Q

i i'|li! I h^n ."aid there.

I no y o u mean you wouldn't arrest her for t h e d r u g s s h e

gave y ::n i, :i s that wl lat yen i meant?
II :

I didn* t say that.

\ Jl I<E J :
I

re r e yen i t:l :i :i i i k i n g ?

i as thinking I wouldn't take her to j a i l ,

ml' nf f

her,

take her to
0'] ;:c ;;

|> i1

yn J .

In i

i

hi

HI^II t" h

<

T h a t ' s what J was

D:i ::i

•

| j * - I,

i

ih

physically
nn

:ar

and

thinking.
rest her

fc r s Dmeth :i ng?

S u p p o s e s h e d:i d n ' t p r o d u c e any dr u g s , d i d you h a v e any p l a n s
t o a.i: i est: 1: ler f DI: ai ry tl :i ii ig a t t l ia J: pc d n t ?

Paap
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James Crapse - D
A.

No.

Q.

So you're talking about if she produces drugs --at

least this is your thought process, that if she produces
drugs then I'm not going to take her to jail for the drugs,
is that what you meant?
A.

This is correct.

Q.

Okay.

What you said is just what you've stated here,

I'll tell you that if you give me the drugs you have in the
house, I promise not to take you to jail, that's how it came
out?
A. Yes.
Q.

Okay.

And what was her response to that?

A.

She still doesn't respond as affirmative or negative.

At that time I asked her to think where in the house she
might store the drugs that she had been using in the past.
And then Mr. Burgess stated, quote, it would be best for you
to give this officer what drugs you have so when you get
sent to take a urinalysis it will come back as negative, end
quote.
Q.

Let me back up a minute.

Maybe I'm reading the report

wrong or there's something in your notes that I don't
understand.

I'm reading this.

"I finally stated to Ms.

Evans, I'll tell you what, if you give me the drugs you have
in the house I promise not to take you to jail today"?
A.

This is correct.

I'm sorry.

I didn't see that line.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOjgTHfiDfiR9 PH "99
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JULIANNE EVANS,
Defendant

HON. THOMAS L. WILLMORE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 991100182

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. Plaintiff has
responded and a hearing was held before the Court on August 10, 1999.
The issue before the Court is whether defendant's consent to search her home was voluntary.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether a consent is voluntary depends upon "the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." State
v. Harmon. 910 P. 2d 1196,1206 (Utah 1995). The United States Supreme Court has held that if a consent
is the product of duress and coercion, it is not a consent at all. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth factors
indicating a lack of duress or coercion which are as follows:
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers;
(2) the absence of an exhibit of force by the officers;
(3) a mere request to search;
(4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and
(5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.
State v. Harmon. 910 P. 2d 1196. 1206
The facts as testified to, by Officers James Crapse and Michael Deryke, at the Suppression
hearing are as follows:
(1) Officer James Crapse stated he was present at defendant's home on March 25,1999 at the
request of an agent of the Department of Family Services, who was present to remove defendant's newborn
child from her home because the child had tested positive for unlawful drugs.
(2) Officer Crapse observed the defendant and Mr. BurgessfromDFS discussing the infant and
why the infant was being removed. The infant was with defendant and she was gathering infant items. The
defendant was cooperating and did not appear at that time to be under the influence of any alcohol or illegal
substances.
(3) Officer Crapse asked defendant to be allowed to take a quick look around the house for
illegal drugs. The defendant responded by indicating she did not know what to say to the officer. Officer
Crapse asked her if that meant she had something to hide from the officer. Officer Crapse testified that
defendant did not respond to that question.
(4) Officer Crapse then testified the defendant shook her head in a negative way and the officer
^ V~)
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attempted to clarify whether defendant did not mind if the police officers looked around or that she did not
want the police officers to look around. The defendant did not respond to Officer Crapse's question.
• (5) Officer Crapse then told the defendant that if she gave him the illegal drugs in the house
he would not take her to jail today and arrest her today,
(6; i ne defendant did not respond further until additional assurances had been made by the
officers that they would not take the defendant to jail that day. The defendant then told the officers that she
did not remember where she put the drags.
(7) Mr. Burgess told the defendant to turn 'the illegal drugs over to the police, The defendant
walked to her purse and pulled out a yellow case which contained a small baggie of methamphetamine, a
brown vile and a glass pipe.

tc

(8) Officer Michael DeRyke was present during i
ndant and his testimony is essentially the same.

i

(9) Defendant was subsequently furnished a Permission To Search form which was marked and
admitted as State's Exhibit 1, The Permission To Search was filled out by Officer Crapse. Defendant read
and signed the Permission To Search and a search of defendant's residence was then conducted, which
located other illegal drugs..
The Court must apply the facts as testified to at the hearing to the factors as set forth in the
Harmon case to determine whether defendant's consent is voluntary. The first factor centers on an absence
of a claim of authority to search by the officers. In this case, there was no claim of authority to search by
the officers. No evidence has been presented to the Court that Officer Crapse and Officer Deryke claimed
any authority whatsoever to search defendant's house. The officers simply asked the defendant for
permission to search
Concerning the second factor, which is an absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, no
evidence has been presented to the Court showing any exhibition offeree by the officers to search or to
force a consent search. The only evidence presented at the hearing were requests made by the officers to
search, The officers did not use coercive tactics and did not take unlawful advantage of an arrest situation
to obtain defendant's consent, In fact, defendant was never arrested by the officers once 'the drugs were
turned over. She received a summons and information filed at a later date
'I he tii.Ii d factor is whether the officers made "a mere request to search."' Defendant argues that
because the officers requested to search numerous times, that renders the consent involuntary. Both officers
testified at the hearing that defendant's answers to the questions were unclear and that is why she was asked
numerous times whether the officers could search her home. The Courtfindsthat because her answers were
unclear, the officers were entitled to ask further questions to clarify her responses. Her answers centered
on she did not know what to say and she shook her head in the negative to compound questions. Even
though the officers requested to search moi e than once, theii repeated requests were proper given the
responses of the defendant.
In reviewing the fourth factor of whether the defendant cooperated in the search, the officers
were present because defendant's baby was being taken into custody by Department of Family Services
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because the infant had tested positive for illegal substances. The officers testified that there was discussion
with the defendant concerning illegal drugs and the fact that they were destroying her life and her family.
The defendant nodded her head in the affirmative to this fact. After the officers had talked to her and told
her they would not take her to jail if she gave the drugs to them, the defendant walked over to her purse and
pulled out a yellow case containing illegal drugs and paraphernalia, which was given to the officers. The
defendant cooperated with the officers. The defendant further cooperated with the officers by reviewing
and signing a Permission To Search, which allowed the officers to search defendant's residence. This factor
strongly shows the consent was voluntary, given the surrounding circumstances.
The final factor to be reviewed is whether there was any deception or trick on the part of the
officer in obtaining defendant's consent. Defendant argues that the promise by Officer Crapse that he
would not take the defendant to jail if she turned over the drugs is coercive or amounts to deception or trick
on the part of the officer. In this case, Officer Crapse testified that he promised to not take the defendant
to jail "today" and he was not going to arrest the defendant at that time if she turned over the illegal drugs
she had in her possession. Officer Crapse did not say, "I'm taking you to jail, unless you will give me the
drugs." On the contrary, Officer Crapse's statement was quite the opposite, "If you give me the drugs, I
will not take you to jail today or arrest you today." Officer Crapse had no authority or ability to arrest her
or take her to jail at that time. Furthermore, he did not use any deception or trick to obtain defendant's
consent. The Court finds that the promise made by the officers was not deceptive or coercive.
Also, when these facts are reviewed with the fact that defendant's baby was being removed
from her home because the baby tested positive for an illegal drug, there was clearly no deception or trick
on the part of the officer. In fact, the officer did not arrest the defendant or take her to jail that day when
the illegal drugs were furnished to the officers.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, as presented to the Court at the Suppression
hearing, the Court finds that defendant's presentation to the officers of the yellow case containing illegal
substances and a glass pipe was voluntary and that defendant's consent to search her residence was
voluntary. Therefore, the Court denies defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
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